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Abstract
Non-contributory pensions are becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide. As their
effects are likely to be context-dependent, evaluating their effects in a wide range of
settings is important for establishing the external validity of the non-contributory
pension literature. We use a new monthly panel dataset and a difference-in-differences
strategy to study the effect of a new non-contributory pension in Singapore (the Silver
Support Scheme or SSS) on labour supply, work expectations, private cash transfers,
and expenditure, 1 year after its implementation. We find no evidence that receiving
SSS payouts led to a fall in labour supply, work expectations, or the receipt of private
cash transfers in the first year after SSS implementation—our estimated effects for
these outcomes are statistically insignificant and are either negative but close to zero or
positive. Our point estimates of the effects of receiving SSS payouts on expenditure are
positive but too imprecise to allow us to make any definitive conclusions. Lastly, we do
not find evidence of anticipatory effects among younger individuals who are not age-
eligible for payouts yet. These results, when coupled with our finding in a companion
paper that the SSS improved recipients’ subjective well-being, suggest that the SSS was
successful in improving recipients’ welfare without substantial crowding out of private
transfers or changes in labour market behaviour of current and future SSS beneficiaries.
Keywords: Non-contributory pensions, Labour supply, Private income transfers,
Crowding out
JEL Classification: H3, H4, I3, J2
1 Introduction
Non-contributory pensions are becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide (Inter-
national Labour Office 2014). These pensions play a crucial role in improving the
retirement security of individuals who do not receive sufficient benefits from contribu-
tory pension schemes (e.g. lower-income workers, informal sector workers, or house-
wives), but can have potentially large effects on labour markets and household
dynamics. The importance and increasing prevalence of non-contributory pensions has
led to a growing body of research that evaluates their impact on key outcomes such as
labour decisions, intra-family cash transfers, and expenditure (see, e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Juarez 2015; Bando et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 1998; Fan 2010; Galiani
et al. 2016). However, the effect of non-contributory pensions can vary across countries
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due to differences in institutions, social norms, and benefit levels. It thus remains im-
portant to evaluate each new or reformed non-contributory pension, to improve the ex-
ternal validity of the literature as a whole.1
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of Singapore’s first national non-contributory
pension (the Silver Support Scheme or SSS) on labour decisions, cash transfers among
family and friends, and expenditure, 1 year after its implementation. The SSS is a
means-tested scheme that targets the neediest 20–30% of Singaporean citizens aged 65
and above. It was announced in end-March 2016 with details on the exact qualifying
criteria and payout levels. The first payout was disbursed in end-July 2016. Payouts are
disbursed on a quarterly basis, and on average, recipients of SSS payouts in our sample
receive around S$500 per quarter, which corresponds to about 14% of the pre-SSS-
announcement mean monthly income from work among SSS recipients who worked
during that period. Eligibility for the SSS is automatically determined based on govern-
ment administrative data and updated yearly. Disbursement of payouts is equally auto-
matic and fuss-free, as it is processed through well-established distribution channels.
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to identify the causal effects of the
SSS. The sample for our main analysis is made up of individuals aged 65 and above in
2016.2 The treated group consists of those who reported receiving an SSS payout at
least once in 2016, while the control group consists of those who did not. Our treat-
ment definition allows us to interpret the policy shock as exogenous, since eligibility of
payouts for 2016 was based on 2015 administrative data. Individuals were thus unable
to select into treatment after the SSS was announced in March 2016. To tackle the pos-
sibility that our treatment and control groups may be sufficiently different to invalidate
the DiD parallel trends assumption, we trim our sample, using individuals’ treatment
propensity, to construct more similar treatment and control groups. We also verify that
our results are robust to a battery of checks that include the use of different control
groups, different re-weighting techniques, and the addition of group-specific time fixed
effects (details in Section 5).
Our data comes from the Singapore Life Panel (SLP), a new longitudinal monthly
survey, which aims to follow a population-representative sample of Singapore citizens
and permanent residents aged 50–70 and their spouses. (See Vaithianathan et al. (2017)
for more details on the SLP.) It captures a rich set of data including demographic
characteristics, labour decisions, private cash transfers, and expenditure. Its monthly
responses allow us to precisely account for announcement effects, to avoid under-
estimating the SSS’s effects (see, e.g. Blundell et al. 2011 for evidence on the importance
of accounting for announcement effects).
We find no evidence that receiving SSS payouts led to a reduction in labour supply
at the extensive or intensive margins—the estimated effects are statistically insignificant
and either negative but close to zero or positive. However, we do find suggestive but
weak evidence that the adjustment in labour supply may not be complete. In a study of
the dynamic effects of SSS, the estimated effects become increasingly negative as time
goes by, even though they remain insignificant.3 In addition, we find no evidence of
persistent changes in expectations about working full-time after age 70 among SSS
recipients. Their expectations of having to work full-time after 70 fell sharply after
disbursement but rebounded soon after. We also find no evidence that SSS recipients
received less from, or gave more private cash transfers to, their family and friends. Our
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estimates, which reflect effects on both the extensive and intensive margins, are statisti-
cally insignificant. In particular, the effects on the probabilities of receiving or giving
cash transfers are close to zero, suggesting that SSS was unlikely to have crowded out
cash transfers from family and friends, or led to a rise in transfers to others.4 Lastly, in
a supplementary analysis (discussed in more detail only in Section 7) based on younger
individuals who are not age-eligible for payouts yet, we find no evidence that expecting
to receive the SSS led to changes in private cash transfers, labour-related decisions,
or expenditure.
Our results, when coupled with the findings in a companion paper that the SSS
improved recipients’ subjective well-being (Chen and Tan 2017),5 suggest that the SSS
was successful in improving recipients’ welfare without substantial crowding out of
private transfers, reductions in labour supply, or changes in the behaviour of younger
individuals who expect to receive SSS payouts in future.
Apart from evaluating an important new pension reform in Singapore, our paper
contributes to the literature on the effects of non-contributory pensions on the labour
market. In our paper, the estimated effect of the SSS on participation in paid work is
lower (close to zero, and statistically insignificant) than the fall of 4 to 6 percentage
points that many other studies on non-contributory pensions find (Aguila et al. 2011;
Bando et al. 2016; Cheng et al. 2018; Fetter and Lockwood 2016; Galiani et al. 2016;
Hernani-Limarino and Mena 2015; Juárez and Pfutze 2015).6 Interestingly, Galiani et
al. (2016) and Bando et al. (2016) find no effects on overall labour supply about 1 year
after a non-contributory pension was rolled out in Mexico and Peru respectively, as
there was a shift from paid work to unpaid work. Galiani et al. (2016) explain that the
shift could be due to beneficiaries preferring “less stressful and less demanding informal
unpaid work within the household”. Following this line of argument, it is possible that
we do not see a drop in paid work participation because paid work in Singapore could
be less stressful and demanding than that in the developing countries, and little infor-
mal unpaid work within the household (such as farming and handicrafts) is available in
Singapore. The lack of an effect on the intensive margin may also be partially explained
by labour market constraints on minimum working hours (see, e.g. Euwals 2001;
Martinez-Granado 2005 for evidence on constraints on working hours; Stewart and
Swaffield 1997). In addition, the relatively small quantum of SSS payouts (in relation to
both recipients’ wage and payouts from many other non-contributory pensions),7 as
well as the possibility that work behaviour may take time to change, may also explain
our result. Regardless of the exact reasons for the smaller estimated effects in our sam-
ple, our results suggest that the effects of non-contributory pensions on labour supply,
as well as the speed of labour market adjustment, are likely to vary by payout level and/
or institutional context.
Our results also add to the literature on whether private cash transfers are crowded
out by public transfers. Findings from this literature are more disparate; effects can
range from complete crowding out to little response, though many studies suggest that
increasing public transfers by a dollar leads to a 20–30 cent fall in private transfers
(Cox and Fafchamps 2007). In the specific context of non-contributory old age pen-
sions, Koh and Yang (2017) find that a new old age pension in South Korea completely
crowded out money transfers from adult children to parents. Jensen (2004) and Fan
(2010) find that expansion or the introduction of new non-contributory pensions led to
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falls in private cash transfers equivalent to 25–30% (for South Africa) and 30–39% (for
Taiwan) of the payout quantum respectively. Bando et al. (2016) and Amuedo-Dorantes
and Juarez (2015) estimate that the probability of receiving a private transfer dropped
by 7–8 percentage points respectively in Peru and Mexico respectively about 1 year
after the implementation of a non-contributory pension for the elderly. On the other
hand, Hernani-Limarino and Mena (2015), Behrman et al. (2011), and Cheng et al.
(2018) find little evidence that the introduction or expansion of non-contributory old
age pensions in Bolivia, Chile, and China had an effect on receipt of private transfers.
Against this backdrop, our finding that SSS recipients do not appear to receive less
private transfers may not be surprising. Our result could be driven by a few reasons.
The exchange motive could be stronger than the altruistic motive for private transfers
(see, e.g. Cox 1987; Cox and Jakubson 1995), as it is common for grandparents in
Singapore to provide care for their grandchildren. The SSS payout quantum could also
be small enough for “donors” of private transfers to brush off,8 and lastly, donors’
behaviour may also take time to adjust. In all, our results for labour decisions and
private transfers suggest that the effects of non-contributory pensions are likely to vary
by institutional context and payout levels.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background informa-
tion on SSS. Section 3 describes our data and construction of the key treatment vari-
able. Section 4 elaborates on our identification strategy and main empirical
specifications, while Section 5 describes our alternative specifications for robustness
checks. Section 6 presents our results. Section 7 discusses our supplementary analysis
on the anticipatory effects of the SSS on younger individuals who are not age-eligible
for payouts yet. Note that Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 focus only on the main analysis,
which looks at the effect of receiving SSS payouts among those who can already start
to receive payouts, i.e. those aged 65 and above in 2016. Lastly, Section 8 concludes.
2 Background on the silver support scheme9
The Silver Support Scheme (SSS) is the first non-contributory pension implemented in
Singapore and is targeted at the neediest 20–30% of Singaporean citizens aged 65 and
above. The introduction of SSS is a significant turning point in Singapore’s pension
system, which has been dominated by a defined contribution scheme, the Central
Provident Fund (CPF).10
SSS details, such as the exact eligibility criteria and payout amounts, were announced
at the end of March 2016.11 Eligible individuals receive quarterly payouts of S$300–
S$750 to supplement their existing retirement income; the exact quantum depends on
the type of public housing (Housing and Development Board, HDB) flat they live in.12
Singaporeans who live in smaller flats will receive more as the government uses flat-
type as a proxy for socioeconomic status. On average, recipients of SSS payouts in our
sample receive around S$500 per quarter, which corresponds to about 14% of the pre-
SSS-announcement mean monthly income from work among SSS recipients who
worked during that period in our sample. The first payout was made in end-July 2016,
followed by end-September 2016. Payouts meant for 2017 were/would be made in end-
December 2016, end-March 2017, end-June 2017, and end-September 2017, ahead of
each calendar quarter. In this study, we focus on the SSS’s effects in its first year
of implementation.
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Individuals’ eligibility for SSS is automatically determined based on administrative
data and is updated yearly. Eligible individuals must (i) be Singapore citizens; (ii)
live in a one- to five-room HDB flat; (iii) not personally own or have a spouse
who owns five-room or larger HDB flats, private property, or multiple properties;
(iv) have contributed no more than S$70,000 to their defined contribution accounts
by age 55; and (v) have a monthly household per-capita income of S$1100 or
below.13 Self-employed persons should also have an average annual net trade
income of not more than S$22,800 when they were between the ages of 45 and 54.
Since the eligibility for the 2016 payouts is based on government data available in
2015, the receipt of SSS payouts in end-July and end-September 2016 is pre-
determined and hence exogenous. However, individuals may be able to self-select
into being eligible for SSS payouts in 2017 by moving into a smaller flat, or by re-
ducing their income. We discuss how we deal with this issue in Sections 3.2, 4
and 5.14
The disbursement of SSS payouts is fuss-free for recipients, as the Singapore govern-
ment has been giving out ad hoc or regular cash transfers to Singaporeans since (at
least) 2008, and thus has efficient systems in place that can be used to disburse new
types of cash transfers. The government credits the payouts to bank accounts that most
Singaporeans have already registered with the government. Those who do not have a
registered bank account will receive a cheque that is mailed to their registered residen-
tial address. If the cheque is not encashed or banked in within 6 months, the govern-
ment will credit the payouts into the individuals’ defined contribution accounts, which
are withdrawable within a year. The set-up for determining eligibility and disbursing
payouts suggests that Singaporeans who are eligible for the SSS payouts will almost cer-
tainly receive their payouts.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Data source
Our data comes from the Singapore Life Panel (SLP), a new longitudinal monthly sur-
vey, which aims to follow a population-representative sample of about 15,000 Singapore
citizens and permanent residents aged 50–70 and their spouses. The survey is con-
ducted by the Centre for Research on the Economics of Ageing (CREA), and it captures
a rich set of data including demographic characteristics, labour decisions, private cash
transfers, and expenditure. More details on the SLP can be found in Vaithianathan et
al. (2017).
We use data from waves 0–23 of the SLP, covering the period May 2015 to Jun 2017.
This data allows us to implement a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strat-
egy, since SSS details were announced in end-Mar 2016 and payouts were disbursed
from end-Jul 2016 onwards.
Before we move on, we highlight two advantages of using this dataset, compared
to surveys which collect data at lower (i.e. yearly or longer) frequencies. First, the
high frequency at which the SSS is collected enables us to precisely time and
separately estimate the announcement and disbursement effects of the SSS. Captur-
ing the announcement effect allows us to avoid under-estimating the SSS’s effects
(Blundell et al. 2011). Second, the SLP also allows us to directly test the validity of
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the DiD identifying assumption of parallel trends, which other studies that use data
from surveys with only two or three time points cannot do.
3.2 Sample and variables
Our main analysis focuses on the impact of receiving Silver Support Scheme (SSS)
payouts. Thus, we restrict our sample to those who would be age-eligible to receive SSS
payouts from 2016 onwards (i.e. those aged 65 and above in 2016). In addition, our
sample includes only Singapore citizens who live in public housing flats15 (two of the eligi-
bility criteria for SSS receipt). This reduces the extent of heterogeneity within our sample.
Our main treatment variable, Received SS, is an indicator for whether an individ-
ual received SSS payouts. This is based on a survey question that is timed to
appear in the month after each SSS disbursement, asking respondents if they
received SSS in the previous month. This dummy variable takes value 1 if individ-
uals reported that they received at least one payout for the year of 2016. This
specification of the treatment status, which hinges only on the receipt of SSS for
the year of 2016, for which eligibility is pre-determined before the announcement
of SSS details, assures us that treatment status is pre-determined and exogenous.
Such a treatment definition may attenuate our treatment effects; we address this
by performing a robustness check where we restrict the control group to those
who definitely did not receive SSS payouts in either 2016 or 2017 (see Section 5).
In addition, we define indicators for the following periods, to allow us to separ-
ately estimate announcement and disbursement effects: (i) the pre-SSS announce-
ment period covering outcome responses corresponding to months before April
2016; (ii) the post-announcement period covering April 2016 to July 2016; and (iii)
the post-disbursement period from August 2016 to June 2017. The periods are
defined in this way because SLP surveys are conducted before the last week of the
month, while the announcement and disbursements were made at the end of the
month.
The outcome variables we focus on are variables related to labour decisions,
private cash transfers, and expenditure. For labour decisions, we look at whether
the respondent received income from work and the amount received. We also have
data on individuals’ subjective probability of working full-time after age 70, which
is reported on a scale of 0–100. For private cash transfers, we examine if the
respondent received or gave money to family/friends, as well as the amount in-
volved. These transfers-related outcomes are reported by the respondent at the
couple level, i.e. based on whether and what the respondent and his/her spouse
received/gave. (If the respondent is single, the reported value will be based only on
the respondent.) Lastly, we investigate the effect of SSS on total expenditure
(which excludes cash gifts, as these are already included as part of private trans-
fers) and sub-categories of expenditure which are reported by the respondent at
the couple level. All outcome variables are collected monthly, other than the ques-
tion on one’s subjective probability of working full-time after age 70, which is
posed quarterly.16
The Singapore Life Panel also contains a rich set of demographic variables which
we use to compare individuals who received SSS against those who did not, and
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refine our identification strategy by restricting our sample to individuals who are
demographically more similar (more details on our identification strategy in Section 4).
3.3 Summary statistics
In Table 1, we show summary statistics that compare baseline demographics between
those who received SSS and those who did not. Focusing on the left panel, we see that
the proportion of respondents who received the Silver Support Scheme (SSS) payouts
(as determined by our key treatment variable described in Section 3.2) is approximately
26%. This is within the range anticipated by the policymakers. Across the range of
demographic variables, the differences in means between those who received SSS and
Table 1 Summary statistics for baseline demographics—comparison between those who received
and did not receive SSS payout, among individuals aged 65 and above in 2016
Untrimmed sample Trimmed sample (propensity score 0.2–0.8)
Mean Norm diff2 Diff in means3 Mean Norm diff2 Diff in means3
SS
(N1 = 429)
No SS
(N1 = 1246)
SS
(N1 = 326)
No SS
(N1 = 564)
Age at 2016 68.86 68.03 0.28 0.83*** 68.99 68.67 0.10 0.32
Married 0.69 0.77 −0.18 −0.08*** 0.67 0.72 −0.12 − 0.05*
Male 0.40 0.54 −0.30 −0.15*** 0.34 0.39 −0.11 −0.05
Chinese 0.87 0.87 0.01 0.00 0.88 0.90 −0.05 −0.02
Malay 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01
Indian 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01
No formal
schooling
0.17 0.12 0.13 0.05** 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.02
Primary
schooling
0.35 0.26 0.20 0.09*** 0.40 0.37 0.06 0.03
Secondary
schooling
0.36 0.41 −0.11 −0.05* 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.00
Lives in 1-
room flat
0.05 0.01 0.22 0.04*** 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.03*
Lives in 2-
room flat
0.05 0.02 0.15 0.03** 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01
Lives in 3-
room flat
0.33 0.21 0.27 0.12*** 0.39 0.33 0.11 0.05
Lives in 4-
room flat
0.36 0.37 −0.03 −0.01 0.36 0.40 −0.09 − 0.04
Lives in 5-
room flat
0.16 0.29 −0.32 −0.13*** 0.12 0.15 −0.11 −0.04
Owns home 0.83 0.88 −0.15 −0.05** 0.82 0.84 −0.04 −0.01
No. of hh
members
2.95 3.28 −0.22 −0.33*** 2.83 3.02 −0.13 −0.19*
No. of total
children
2.18 2.15 0.02 0.03 2.14 2.21 −0.05 −0.07
Retirement
preparedness4
2.17 2.33 −0.18 −0.16*** 2.12 2.15 −0.04 −0.03
Notes:
1N refers to number of respondents
2Normalised differences are computed as in Imbens (2015) (as the difference in means standardised by the square
root of the mean variance of both groups)
3***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively, based on a t-test
4This is a self-assessment on preparedness for retirement, captured on a scale of 1 to 5, with a higher value representing
greater preparedness. This was captured during the baseline survey, which was conducted before the announcement of
details on the Silver Support Scheme
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those who did not are mostly statistically significant and in the expected direction. For
example, recipients are less likely to live in five-room flats, and they feel less financially
prepared for retirement.
While differences in characteristics between treatment and control groups do not ne-
cessarily invalidate our chosen identification strategy (i.e. difference-in-differences
(DiD)), there could be concerns that these differences are sufficient to lead to non-
parallel trends in our outcome variables in the absence of treatment, which would then
violate the DiD identifying assumption. As alluded to at the end of Section 3.2, we will
address this concern by restricting our sample using the method we will describe in
Section 4.
4 Identification strategy and empirical model
4.1 Identification strategy
We implement a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to estimate the causal
average treatment-on-treated effect of receiving Silver Support Scheme (SSS) pay-
outs on labour decisions, private cash transfers, and expenditure. Our sample con-
sists of Singapore citizen respondents aged 65 and above in 2016 who live in
public housing flats. The treated group comprises those who received SSS payouts,
and the control group those who did not. As discussed in Section 3.2, our treat-
ment variable takes value 1 if individuals reported that they received at least one
payout in 2016. This means that treatment status is exogenous, as eligibility for
SSS payouts in 2016 was pre-determined before the announcement of SSS details.
Such a treatment definition may attenuate our treatment effects, as some members
of the control group may be treated; we address this by performing a robustness
check where we restrict the control group to those who definitely did not receive
SSS payouts (see Section 5).
To tackle the possibility that our treatment and control groups may be suffi-
ciently different to violate the DiD identifying assumption of parallel trends in the
absence of treatment, we restrict our sample to individuals who are more similar
demographically. We do so by first estimating the propensity score of being a SSS
recipient using the data-driven algorithm described in Imbens (2015) on a rich set
of baseline demographic characteristics. The propensity score is eventually esti-
mated based on the following selection of covariates and some of their interac-
tions: age as at 2016, marital status, gender, ethnicity, education, public housing
flat-type, whether respondent’s father is still living, number of household members,
number of living children, income of self and spouse, self-assessment of financial
preparedness for retirement, and satisfaction with one’s economic situation. We
then exclude individuals with either very low or high propensity scores, and retain
a sample which includes only those with propensity scores from 0.2 to 0.8.
Trimming the sample in this way improves the comparability of the treatment
and control groups (see right panel of Table 1). Most differences in mean values of
demographic characteristics are no longer statistically significant, and the magni-
tude of the normalised differences are small (the largest is 0.14). (The normalised
differences are computed as the difference in means standardised by the square
root of the mean variance of both groups (Imbens 2015)). The distributions of
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variables related to the SSS eligibility criteria for both the control and treatment
groups also became more similar (Fig. 1). The improved similarity of both groups
increases the probability that the DiD identifying assumption will be met.
Having said this, we acknowledge that the improved similarity of both groups in
terms of observables does not necessarily imply improved similarity in unobserv-
ables. However, remaining differences in unobservables are unlikely to lead to
differences in trend between the treated and control groups as our treatment defin-
ition excludes the possibility of self-selection into receiving SSS payouts.
In addition, we check the validity of the DiD identifying assumption for our study
more directly. We do so by performing visual checks (by plotting the unconditional
means of our outcome variables) and statistical checks (by including placebo leads in
our empirical specification—see Section 4.2). Our checks suggest that our identifying
Fig. 1 Density plots/histograms of key demographics before (left panel) and after (right panel) trimming
(Note the change in scale of the horizontal axis after trimming)
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assumptions are generally valid. We discuss the results of these checks in more detail
in Section 6.
4.2 Main specifications
Our key regression specification is used to estimate the overall effects of Silver Support
Scheme (SSS):
Y it ¼
X−1
k¼−3
βpre;k Received SSi  Preannt;k
 
þ βann Received SSi  Anntopayt
 þ βdisb Received SSi  Postpayt
 
þ αi þ γt þ ∈it
ð1Þ
where Yit is the outcome variable for respondent i at time t; Received SSi is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the individual received at least one payout for the year
2016 (described in Section 3.2); Preannt, − 3, Preannt, − 2, Preannt, − 1 are dummy vari-
ables that take value 1 if time t corresponds to January, February, and March 2016
respectively; Anntopay is a dummy for the period between announcement and payment
(waves 9–12, Apr–Jul 2016) and Postpay is a dummy for the period after disbursement
(waves 13–23, Aug 2016–Jun 2017). αi and γt are individual and time fixed-effects re-
spectively. The baseline/suppressed period consists of waves two to five (Sep–Dec
2015).17 We cluster the standard errors at the household level.
βann and βdisb are our main coefficients of interest, capturing the treatment effects
during the announcement and disbursement periods respectively. βpre, k—the coeffi-
cients for our placebo leads—are used to test the validity of the difference-in-
differences (DiD) identifying assumption in our study. A statistically insignificant βpre, k
would give us more confidence that the assumption is valid.
As individuals’ behaviour may take time to adjust, we also estimate Eq. (2) to study
the dynamics of the effect over time:
Y it ¼
X−1
k¼−3
βpre;k Received SSi  Preannt;k
 
þ βann Received SSi  Anntopayt
 
þ
X
p∈P
βdisb;p Received SSi  Postpayt Quartert;p
 
þ αi þ γt þ ∈it
ð2Þ
where Quartert, p is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if month t belongs to quarter
p. We split the post-disbursement period into quarters, such that P includes dummies
for the periods August–September 2016, Oct–December 2016, January–March 2017,
and April–May 2017.18
Lastly, we carry out a series of heterogeneity analyses, to examine if the SSS’s effects
vary by net assets, subjective financial preparedness for retirement, flat-type (a proxy
for wealth and the determinant of payout quantum), and gender. We do so by interact-
ing the treatment variables Received SSi × Anntopayt and Received SSi × Postpayt with
the variables listed above. The variables for the heterogeneity analyses were chosen as
the effects of permanent income shocks on the outcomes we study are likely to vary by
wealth/liquidity constraints, amount received, and gender (see, e.g. Hernani-Limarino
and Mena 2015; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010; Kaushal 2014).
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5 Potential threats to identification and robustness checks
While we have attempted to construct sufficiently similar treatment and control groups
that are likely to satisfy the DiD identifying assumptions, some identification issues
may remain. Here, we describe a series of robustness checks designed to address these
potential issues. These checks include the use of different control/treatment groups
and different re-weighting techniques to address potential failures of the parallel trends
assumption and mismeasurement issues, as well as the use of different specifications of
Eq. (1) to test the sensitivity of our main estimates. The results of these checks are
summarised in Section 6; full results are in Appendices 1, 2, and 3.
First, there may be measurement error with respect to our treatment variable. A
significant proportion of individuals defined as treated reported that they received at
least one payout for 2016, but not for 2017. This is likely to be driven by misreporting,
as the nature of the eligibility criteria make it unlikely for SSS receipt status to change
dramatically in the short run. In addition, some control individuals may have received
SSS payouts, as they reported that they received SSS payouts in 2017 but not 2016.
Both types of measurement error may attenuate the estimated effects of receiving SSS
payouts.
To study whether attenuation from the sources above is an issue, we estimate the
following regression:
Y it ¼
X−1
k¼−3
βpre;kðReceived SSi  Preannt;kÞ
þ
X
g∈G
βann;gðAnntopayt  Subseti;gÞ
þ
X
g∈G
βdisb;gðPostpayt  Subseti;gÞ
þ αi þ γt þ ∈it
ð3Þ
where Subseti, g is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual belongs to sub-
set g. G includes the following subsets: individuals who (i) received payouts in 2016 and
2017; (ii) received payouts in 2016 but not 2017; (iii) received payouts in 2016; payout
status in 2017 is missing; (iv) received payouts in 2017 but not 2016 (this subset is part
of the control group in the main specification19); and (v) did not receive payouts in
2016; payout status in 2017 is missing. The suppressed subset (i.e. control group) com-
prises individuals who reported that they did not receive SSS payouts in either 2016 or
2017.
Our coefficients of interest are those related to subset (i)—the subset least likely to
suffer from misreporting. These coefficients are based on the comparison between
those who almost certainly received SSS payouts (i.e. subset (i)) and those who almost
certainly did not receive SSS payouts (i.e. suppressed subset), thus reducing potential
attenuation from the sources of mismeasurement described above. If these estimates
are similar to those from our main regression, attenuation is less likely to be a major
issue in our study.
Second, even though respondents in our control group do not receive SSS payouts,
their outcomes may still be affected by the SSS if his/her spouse receives SSS payouts.20
This may attenuate our main estimates.
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To account for this, we re-define our treatment groups so that they are based on the
number and identity of SSS recipients within a household, and estimate the following
equation21:
Y it ¼
X−1
k¼−3
βpre;k At least one treatedi  Preannt;k
 
þ
X
g∈G
βann;g Who treatedi;g  Anntopayt
 
þ
X
g∈G
βdisb;g Who treatedi;g  Postpayt
 
þ αi þ γt þ ∈it
ð4Þ
where At least one treatedi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if either respondent i
or respondent i’s spouse received SSS; Who_treatedi, g can be a dummy variable indi-
cating that (i) only the respondent received SSS, (ii) only the respondent’s spouse
received SSS, or (iii) both the respondent and his/her spouse received SSS. The control
group in this regression is thus made up of respondents who did not receive SSS pay-
outs and whose spouse did not receive SSS payouts either.
To give us a sense of whether attenuation is a major problem for our main estimates,
we compare our main estimates to the coefficients related to the subset in which only
the respondent received SSS payouts. Other coefficients in this specification allow us to
explore whether effects vary when the number of people in a household receiving SSS
increases.
Third, to address concerns that our main specification’s control group is not ideal, we
re-estimate Eq. (1) using an alternative control group selected from younger individuals
who are not age-eligible for SSS payouts yet (i.e. those aged 56 to 6322 in 2016).23 We
estimate the propensity of receiving SSS payouts for these younger individuals (using
the coefficient estimates from our earlier logistic regression described in Section 4.1)
and define the alternative control group as those with propensity scores of 0.2–0.8, to
match the propensity scores for our treatment group in our main regression. In
addition to using younger respondents as an alternative control group, we also apply
different re-weighting techniques on our original control group to address differences
in baseline covariates between the control and treatment groups. (More details at the
end of the next paragraph.)
Fourth, using the original control group, we test the sensitivity of our results by
estimating different variations of Eq. (1) where we (i) remove placebo leads to
check if our results are sensitive to our choice of the baseline period; (ii) restrict
the sample to individuals with at least one observation in each of the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods, to
check that compositional differences are not driving our results; (iii) add group-
specific time fixed effects (based on ethnicity and flat-types) to allow for differen-
tial time trends in different groups; (iv) add age fixed effects; (v) add control
covariates for other welfare payments24; and (vi) implement Abadie (2005)’s semi-
parametric DiD25 and DiD matching using 1-to-1 nearest neighbour matching to
check if our results are robust to different re-weighting methods used to address
imbalances in baseline characteristics.
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6 Results and discussion
In this section, we discuss the effects of receiving SSS on each type of outcome vari-
able—labour decisions, private cash transfers, and expenditure.
6.1 Labour decisions
Receiving SSS payouts appears to have had little, if any, effect on the labour-related
outcomes we study in this section.
Table 2 reports the overall effect of receiving SSS payouts on labour-related outcomes
(specified at top of each column). The coefficients for the placebo leads are statistically
insignificant. This observation, together with the similar pre-treatment trends we
observe in Fig. 2, suggest that the parallel trends assumption is likely to hold for this
set of variables. The coefficients for the announcement and disbursement effects of
SSS, βann and βdisb, are statistically insignificant across all variables studied. These coef-
ficients are also close to zero for column (1) (which looks at whether an individual
received income from work in the last month), and positive for columns (2) and (3)
(which look at the amount of income received from work).26 Our point estimate for
the probability of engaging in paid work is lower than the fall of 4 to 6 percentage
points that many other studies on non-contributory pensions find (Aguila et al. 2011;
Bando et al. 2016; Cheng et al. 2018; Fetter and Lockwood 2016; Galiani et al. 2016;
Hernani-Limarino and Mena 2015; Juárez and Pfutze 2015),27 while our results related
Table 2 Overall impact of receiving SSS payouts on labour decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whether received
income
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Probability of working
full- time after age 70
Received SS × Jan 0.006 24.920 − 182.536 −2.311
(0.021) (69.479) (154.643) (3.304)
Received SS × Feb 0.010 29.468 7.444 –
(0.020) (34.471) (91.964) –
Received SS × Mar 0.021 57.272 − 118.865 –
(0.020) (48.284) (217.277) –
Received SS × announce-to-pay 0.012 97.578 66.047 −2.117
(0.018) (78.829) (92.580) (3.194)
Received SS × post-pay −0.010 67.668 44.921 −4.335
(0.017) (68.360) (98.466) (2.950)
Mean 0.27 331 1229 18.55
S.D. 0.45 894 1366 30.38
Observations 16,062 15,997 4596 3536
R-squared 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.64
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the individual and
monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in column (4) are collected at the
individual level every quarter
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS
(i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for respondents
who received SSS payouts
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to amount of income received from work suggest that it is unlikely that labour supply
fell along the intensive margin. Finally, column (4) shows that there is little evidence of
any persistent changes in recipients’ subjective probability of working full-time at
age 70.
Table 3 studies how individuals’ behaviour might have changed over time. We high-
light two interesting trends. First, while our results for whether an individual received
income from work (column (1)) remain statistically insignificant, the coefficients of the
treatment-related variables fall almost monotonically as time goes by. Second, there
was a sharp fall in SSS recipients’ subjective probability of working full-time at age 70
immediately after receiving their first SSS payout (column (4)). However, recipients’
expectations readjusted very quickly—SSS recipients’ self-assessed probability of
working full-time at 70 rose quickly soon after and was no longer statistically signifi-
cant in 2017. In addition, we find little evidence that these effects vary substantially by
Fig. 2 Trends of key labour-related variables (The periods to the left of the first and second dotted vertical
lines refer to the pre-announcement and pre-disbursement periods respectively)
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recipients’ net assets, subjective financial preparedness for retirement, flat-type, or gen-
der. (Results available on request.)
These results are robust to the series of robustness checks we described in Section 5
(see Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 in Appendix 1 for results). In particular, attenuation
of our results due to mismeasurement/having a spouse receive SSS payouts does not seem
to be an important issue for this set of outcomes, as the treatment effects estimated from
regressions where we try to address attenuation (Eqs. (3) and (4)) are similar to or smaller
than treatment effects we estimate using our main specification (Eq. (1)).
In all, we find no evidence that receiving SSS reduced labour supply along either the
extensive or intensive margins in the first year of the SSS’s implementation—our esti-
mates are statistically insignificant and either negative and close to zero, or positive,
which imply a short-run labour supply elasticity (with respect to income) of zero. The
lack of a short-run response in labour supply is not too surprising given the relatively
modest payout levels,28 and the fact that those who receive the highest payouts are also
the least able to reduce labour supply (i.e. those who stay in the smallest flats, who are
likely to be poorer). In addition, receiving SSS does not appear to have a persistent
impact on future work expectations. However, there is suggestive evidence that SSS
recipients’ behaviour may not have fully adjusted yet and that their labour supply may
fall further in future.
Table 3 Temporal impact of receiving SSS payouts on labour decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whether received
income
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Probability of working full-
time after age 70
Received SS × Jan 0.00631 24.92 − 182.6 −2.324
(0.0206) (69.49) (154.8) (3.304)
Received SS × Feb 0.00981 29.45 7.016 –
(0.0201) (34.46) (92.33) –
Received SS × Mar 0.0211 57.28 − 119.1 –
(0.0196) (48.28) (217.6) –
Received SS × announce-to-pay 0.0123 97.70 65.48 −2.125
(0.0178) (78.85) (92.73) (3.194)
Received SS × Aug-Sep 2016 0.00912 90.89 21.95 –
(0.0189) (74.75) (84.50) –
Received SS × Oct-Dec 2016 −0.0137 70.53 47.54 −7.164**
(0.0189) (85.19) (134.2) (3.308)
Received SS × Jan-Mar 2017 −0.0115 62.68 32.63 −2.330
(0.0187) (66.13) (134.3) (3.384)
Received SS × Apr-May 2017 −0.0221 46.39 86.42 −3.185
(0.0209) (62.31) (146.6) (3.413)
Observations 16,062 15,997 4596 3536
R-squared 0.808 0.701 0.751 0.638
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the individual and
monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in column (4) are collected at the
individual level every quarter. Therefore, estimates are not available for the period Aug-Sep 2016
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (2). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS
(i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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6.2 Private cash transfers
Receiving SSS payouts appears to have had little impact on whether recipients gave or
received private cash transfers. A concern for this set of results is that our identifying
assumption may not hold as well for variables related to whether SSS recipients
received private cash transfers. While the placebo leads in Table 4 are statistically insig-
nificant, Fig. 3 shows that there seems to be a spike in the variables related to transfers
received by SSS recipients, at approximately 1 or 2 months before the SSS announce-
ment. Nonetheless, as we will see later in this sub-section, our robustness checks give
us similar results, giving us more confidence that receiving SSS payouts has had little
effect on private transfers.
Table 4 reports the effect of receiving SSS payouts on whether (and how much) an
individual received and gave cash transfers to their family and friends. The coefficients
for the announcement and disbursement effects of SSS, βann and βdisb, are statistically
insignificant across all transfer-related variables. These coefficients are also close to
zero for the variables related to whether an individual received or gave private cash
transfers (columns (1) and (4) respectively), and positive for variables related to the
amount of private transfers received (columns (2) and (3)).29 Our results on the prob-
ability of receiving private cash transfers (the extensive margin) are similar to results
from papers studying non-contributory pensions in Bolivia, Chile, and China (Behrman
et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2018; Hernani-Limarino and Mena 2015), and precise enough
to exclude falls of the magnitude (7–8 percentage points) seen in Peru and Mexico
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez 2015; Bando et al. 2016), while our results related to the
Table 4 Overall impact of receiving SSS payouts on private cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount given
(positive)
Received SS × Jan −0.007 13.920 12.428 0.021 6.843 154.235
(0.030) (37.129) (48.749) (0.029) (27.856) (163.458)
Received SS × Feb 0.008 29.747 61.918 0.040 0.547 9.913
(0.029) (33.602) (41.753) (0.033) (28.959) (184.678)
Received SS × Mar 0.041 37.983 34.748 0.008 −25.217 −13.378
(0.026) (28.675) (36.247) (0.027) (23.662) (121.744)
Received SS × announce-to-pay −0.017 0.121 31.817 0.021 4.623 32.431
(0.021) (22.432) (29.931) (0.018) (16.486) (114.317)
Received SS × post-pay −0.014 14.711 54.170 0.011 −5.946 20.925
(0.021) (27.121) (34.599) (0.020) (18.265) (95.438)
Mean 0.63 542.78 860.12 0.16 63.16 397.36
S.D. 0.48 669.69 661.61 0.37 325.42 731.46
Observations 15,486 15,451 9100 15,424 15,400 1940
R-squared 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.43 0.20 0.52
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS
(i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for respondents
who received SSS payouts
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amount of private transfers received suggest that it is unlikely that private transfers to
SSS recipients fell along the intensive margin.
There does not appear to be a clear pattern in how transfers received and given by
SSS recipients change over time (Table 5), and the effect does not appear to vary
substantially by recipients’ net assets, subjective financial preparedness for retirement,
flat-type, or gender (results available on request).
Fig. 3 Trends of key private transfer-related variables (The periods to the left of the first and second dotted
vertical lines refer to the pre-announcement and pre-disbursement periods respectively)
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Lastly, our results are robust to the series of checks we describe in Section 5 (see
Appendix 2 for results). In particular, robustness checks that partially address our
concern of potentially different time trends between the treated and control groups in
our main specification produce similar results (see Table 16 and columns (7) and (8)
of Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20 where an alternative control group and other re-
weighting schemes are considered30). The estimated coefficients of the placebo leads
from these checks are generally similar or smaller in magnitude than those from our
main estimates, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption may hold better in
these specifications. Among the robustness checks where the parallel trends assump-
tion appears to hold better, the estimated announcement and disbursement effects are
generally similar to or smaller in magnitude than estimates from our main regression.
In addition to the robustness checks we describe in Section 5, we study the SSS’s
effects on transfers using a separate set of questions on annual transfers (results avail-
able on request). As these questions are asked annually, they may be subject to less of
the month-to-month variability we observe for our main set of transfer-related vari-
ables. Our results in this sub-section are robust to estimations from this separate set
of annual questions. Finally, our robustness checks designed to deal with potential
attenuation of the estimated SSS effects also show that attenuation is unlikely to be a
serious issue in this case (Tables 14 and 15).
Table 5 Temporal impact of receiving SSS payouts on private cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount given
(positive)
Received SS × Jan −0.00685 13.92 12.43 0.0213 6.852 154.7
(0.0305) (37.13) (48.75) (0.0295) (27.86) (163.7)
Received SS × Feb 0.00764 29.75 61.90 0.0395 0.581 11.06
(0.0288) (33.60) (41.75) (0.0330) (28.96) (185.1)
Received SS × Mar 0.0414 38.00 34.67 0.00832 −25.21 −12.04
(0.0264) (28.67) (36.20) (0.0265) (23.66) (122.2)
Received SS × announce-to-pay −0.0171 0.175 31.87 0.0212 4.667 31.41
(0.0214) (22.44) (29.97) (0.0185) (16.49) (113.9)
Received SS × Aug-Sep 2016 −0.0123 23.89 65.22* 0.0123 0.121 25.07
(0.0243) (28.03) (36.40) (0.0208) (18.25) (106.9)
Received SS × Oct-Dec 2016 −0.0164 16.85 65.89* 0.00452 −18.57 −53.73
(0.0231) (28.93) (36.85) (0.0225) (19.41) (119.4)
Received SS × Jan-Mar 2017 −0.0251 9.136 54.25 0.00879 0.377 101.7
(0.0232) (31.40) (41.33) (0.0240) (21.11) (114.0)
Received SS × Apr-May 2017 0.00256 10.20 24.28 0.0215 −2.106 −11.14
(0.0252) (31.16) (39.70) (0.0233) (18.73) (99.97)
Observations 15,486 15,451 9100 15,424 15,400 1940
R-squared 0.733 0.773 0.773 0.425 0.196 0.523
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (2). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e.
aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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In all, our results suggest that in the first year of the SSS’s implementation, receipt of
SSS payouts was unlikely to have crowded out private cash transfers from friends and
family to SSS recipients and was unlikely to have led to a rise in recipients giving cash
transfers to others. This lack of crowding out of private transfers in our sample is not
too surprising, given the relatively modest SSS payouts,31 when other studies which
look at non-contributory pensions with higher payout levels have found a similar lack
of crowding-out (Behrman et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2018; Hernani-Limarino and
Mena 2015).32
6.3 Expenditure
Our ability to make definitive statements about the effect of the SSS on expenditure is
hampered by the imprecision of our estimates. We therefore relegate our detailed
discussion of our expenditure-related results to Appendix 3 in the interest of space.
Briefly, our ability to make definitive statements about the effect of SSS on total and
non-durables expenditure is hampered by the imprecision of our estimates—our point
estimates are positive and quite large in magnitude, but statistically insignificant. In
addition, our identifying assumption does not seem to hold well for durables expend-
iture, even though the effects are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, these
expenditure-related results need to be interpreted with caution and corroborated by
studies using other datasets before a more definitive conclusion can be made.
7 Supplementary analyses on anticipation effects
Finally, we carry out supplementary analyses to explore whether younger individuals,
who are not age eligible to receive SSS payouts yet, change their behaviour when they
expect to receive SSS payouts in the future. Our sample for this analysis is restricted to
those who are aged 56–63 in 2016, and therefore age-ineligible for the SSS over the
period we study.33 Our estimation strategy in this section follows the strategy we laid
out for our main results in Section 4, with the treated group being defined as those
who expect to receive SSS payouts in future.
We estimate the effect of expecting to receive SSS payouts in the future by replacing
the “Received SS” dummy in Eq. (1) with the “Expect SS” dummy:
Y it ¼
X−1
k¼−3
βpre;k Expect SSi  Preannt;k
 
þ βann Expect SSi  Anntopayt
 þ βdisb Expect SSi  Postpayt
 
þ αi þ γt þ ∈it
ð5Þ
where Expect SSi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual reported at
least once in 2016 or 2017 that they expect to receive SSS payouts in the future. As in
our main analyses, βann and βdisb are our main coefficients of interest, capturing the
treatment effects during the announcement and disbursement periods respectively. βpre,
k—the coefficients for our placebo leads—are used to test the validity of the difference-
in-differences (DiD) identifying assumption.
We acknowledge that identification may be problematic in this section, as those who
report that they expect to receive the SSS may have inherently different time trends
from those who do not. Having said this, our pre-treatment placebo leads are generally
statistically insignificant (see Tables 6 and 7 and Table 32), giving us a more confidence
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in the results reported in this section. In the end, however, we recommend that our
results in this section be interpreted with caution.
We do not find any evidence that expecting to receive the SSS led to changes in
labour-related decisions (see Table 6), private cash transfers (see Table 7) or expend-
iture (see Table 32 in Appendix 4)—our estimated announcement and disbursement
effects are all statistically insignificant and close to zero (especially for labour-related
decisions and private cash transfers). This result is not too surprising, as individuals
who expect to receive SSS payouts in future are likely to be liquidity/credit constrained
and are unlikely to be able to adjust their behaviour before they start receiving SSS
payouts when they become age-eligible (see, e.g. Galiani et al. 2016; Jappelli and
Pistaferri 2010).
8 Conclusions
This paper adds to the literature on the effects of non-contributory pensions on labour
decisions and private cash transfers, by using a difference-in-differences strategy and a
new high-frequency panel dataset to evaluate the effect of a new non-contributory pen-
sion from Singapore (the Silver Support Scheme, or SSS). We find no evidence that
SSS recipients reduced their labour supply, experienced persistent changes in the sub-
jective probability that they will be working full-time past age 70, received fewer cash
Table 6 Overall impact of expecting to receive SSS payouts on labour decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received income
Amount
received
Amount
received
(positive)
Probability of
working full- time
after age 62
Probability
of working full- time
after age 65
Probability
of working full- time
after age 70
Expect SS ×
Jan
0.001 −55.220 −
109.955
− 0.752 − 0.786 0.594
(0.010) (54.173) (68.180) (1.740) (1.519) (1.407)
Expect SS ×
Feb
−0.013 −34.121 15.826 – – –
(0.011) (52.164) (61.606) – – –
Expect SS ×
Mar
−0.002 −
139.445**
−
190.474**
– – –
(0.011) (64.163) (83.188) – – –
Expect SS ×
announce-
to-pay
−0.001 −21.650 −11.847 − 1.467 −1.031 − 1.887
(0.010) (40.859) (42.438) (1.623) (1.421) (1.362)
Expect SS ×
post-pay
−0.002 −26.508 −30.540 − 0.949 − 0.287 0.117
(0.011) (45.552) (44.553) (1.650) (1.429) (1.342)
Mean 0.70 1951 2783 48.45 37.68 22.27
S.D. 0.46 2514 2588 34.68 33.48 29.04
Observations 51,578 51,432 35,475 13,581 16,490 16,502
R-squared 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.67 0.67 0.63
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the
individual and monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in columns
(4)–(6) are collected at the individual level every quarter
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are not age-eligible
for SSS (i.e. aged 56 to 63 in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score
of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for
respondents who expected to receive SSS payouts
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transfers from, or gave more cash transfers to family and friends. Our results are robust
to the battery of robustness checks described in Section 5 that include the use of differ-
ent control groups, different reweighting methods, and the addition of group-specific
time fixed effects. However, we do find weak evidence that the adjustment in recipients’
labour supply may not be complete yet. Lastly, we do not find any evidence of anticipa-
tory effects—individuals who are not yet age-eligible for the SSS but expect to receive
the SSS in future do not exhibit changes in labour supply, work expectations, private
transfers, or expenditure.
We emphasise that these are results for the first year of the SSS’s implementation
and individuals’ behaviour may not have fully adjusted yet. It would therefore be useful
to revisit this question in the future, to study the SSS’s effects in the medium and long
run. In addition, it would be useful to evaluate the effect of the SSS using larger data-
sets (e.g. administrative datasets), to improve the precision of the estimated effects.
Nonetheless, we highlight that the magnitude of the SSS’s effects we observe in its first
year of implementation are substantially lower than the magnitude of the effects of
other non-contributory pensions assessed 1 year after implementation (e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Juarez 2015; Bando et al. 2016), suggesting that the institutional and
socio-economic context in Singapore, as well as the design of the SSS, may mitigate
any falls in labour supply or private cash transfers.
In all, our results, when coupled with the finding in a companion paper that the SSS
improved recipients’ subjective well-being (Chen and Tan 2017),34 suggest that the SSS
was successful in improving recipients’ welfare without substantial reductions in labour
Table 7 Overall impact of expecting to receive SSS payouts on private cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount given
(positive)
Expect SS × Jan −0.024* − 13.486 13.934 0.012 −4.007 −35.206
(0.014) (15.110) (30.477) (0.016) (12.908) (39.509)
Expect SS × Feb −0.011 − 11.979 − 25.963 − 0.021 − 26.840 −14.883
(0.014) (16.002) (39.657) (0.018) (20.483) (54.700)
Expect SS × Mar 0.002 21.790 36.309 0.016 −13.168 −34.825
(0.013) (13.486) (28.706) (0.016) (14.962) (42.608)
Expect SS × announce-to-pay −0.005 4.486 4.767 0.007 −3.572 −4.403
(0.011) (11.380) (23.437) (0.012) (10.240) (35.883)
Expect SS × post-pay −0.007 2.602 18.775 −0.004 −11.093 −17.312
(0.012) (12.084) (25.973) (0.013) (9.670) (31.965)
Mean 0.33 231.35 707.28 0.29 122.02 427.49
S.D. 0.47 461.00 559.60 0.45 354.73 557.09
Observations 49,565 49,471 15,293 49,313 49,274 13,278
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.61 0.42 0.50
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are not age-eligible for SSS
(i.e. aged 56 to 63 in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for respondents
who expected to receive SSS payouts
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supply, crowding out of private transfers, or changes in the behaviour of younger indi-
viduals who expect to receive SSS payouts in future. In addition, our results from this
paper suggest that the effects of non-contributory pensions are likely to vary by institu-
tional and socio-economic context as well as payout levels. It will thus remain import-
ant to evaluate introductions of or reforms to non-contributory pensions, to obtain
more generalizable evidence on the effects of non-contributory pensions.
Endnotes
1For more on context dependence and the importance of accumulating evidence to move
towards external validity, see, e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2017).
2We also carry out a supplementary analysis on the effects of expecting to receive the
SSS on younger individuals who are not age-eligible for payouts yet (i.e. individuals
aged 56–63 in 2016). For clarity of our exposition, this supplementary analysis is
discussed in more detail only in Section 7. All other sections describe our main analysis
on the effect of receiving SSS payouts, using a sample of individuals who can already
start to receive payouts, i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016.
3This delayed adjustment is unlikely to be driven by workers’ inability to resign due
to binding contracts, as the typical resignation notice period in Singapore is 1 month
for full-time jobs (Ministry of Manpower, 2017)—a period far shorter than the 1 year
post-implementation period we study.
4As an aside, while we also examine SSS’s effect on recipients’ expenditure, we are
unable to make definitive conclusions. Our estimated treatment effects are quite large
and positive but imprecise, and the DiD identifying assumption may be violated for
expenditure on durables.
5These improvements in subjective well-being may be due to reasons unrelated to current
consumption (e.g. improved retirement security arising from an unexpected increase in per-
manent income). In addition, we are unable to rule out the possibility of these changes be-
ing due to increases in current consumption. While our expenditure-related results are
statistically insignificant, the point estimates are positive and quite large.
6Some have found bigger effects (e.g. Danzer, 2013; Juárez and Pfutze, 2015).
7The average SSS payout in our sample is about 14% of the pre-announcement mean
monthly wage among SSS recipients who worked, lower than payouts from many other
non-contributory pensions studied in the literature. For example, payouts were equiva-
lent to more than twice the median per capita income in South Africa (Case and
Deaton, 1998; Jensen, 2004), 96 and 76% of mean labour income for eligible individuals
in Mexico (Galiani et al., 2016; Juárez and Pfutze, 2015) and Peru (Bando et al. 2016)
respectively, and about 25% of the 1939 median wage for 60–64-year-olds for the US
Old Age Assistance program (Fetter and Lockwood, 2016).
8For example, SSS recipients in our sample receive payouts equivalent to about 14%
of their mean pre-announcement wage. This is lower than, e.g. the 76% of mean per-
adult-equivalent labour income that recipients in Bando et al. (2016)’s study receive.
9Most of the details in this section can also be found in our companion paper which
looks at the effect of the SSS on subjective well-being (Chen and Tan, 2017).
10The monthly retirement payouts from Singapore’s defined contribution scheme does
not depend on current work status, but starts at a pre-determined payout eligibility age
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(65 as of 2018, but can be deferred by choice). The receipt of retirement payouts from the
scheme does not require one to stop work or earn less income.
11The Government first announced the introduction of the Silver Support Scheme
(SSS) in early 2015, but details on qualifying criteria were not announced then. This
implies that even if Singaporeans had some expectations about whether they would re-
ceive payouts from SSS, these expectations were probably weak.
1280% of Singaporeans (as of 2016—see Department of Statistics (2017)) live in public
housing apartments (flats) which come in different sizes, and 90% of these households
own their flat (Housing and Development Board 2017). Flat sizes or flat-types are often
used as a proxy for socio-economic status by the government to target subsidies and
transfers. The SSS payout quantum schedule for individuals living in each type of flat is:
1- and 2-room flats: S$750; 3-room flats: S$600; 4-room flats: S$450; 5-room flats: S$300.
13This implies that SSS recipients can continue working, and their monthly income
can even exceed S$1100. As long their per-capita household income does not exceed
S$1100, SSS payouts will continue to be made to these recipients.
14Briefly, we restrict the treatment group to only those who received SSS in 2016.
This may attenuate our treatment effects; we address this by performing a robustness
check where we restrict the control group to those who definitely did not receive SSS
payouts in either 2016 or 2017 (see Section 5).
1580% of Singaporeans (as of 2016—see Department of Statistics (2017)) live in public
housing apartments (flats).
16We include only outcome values from wave two onwards as wave zero was the
baseline survey, and wave one was a pilot survey that included only a subset of respon-
dents. We also exclude transfers-related data that were collected in wave three as the
data collected was affected by a technical glitch.
17We include only outcome values from wave two onwards as wave zero was the
baseline survey, and wave one was a pilot survey that included only a subset of respon-
dents. We also exclude transfers-related data that were collected in wave three as the
data collected was affected by a glitch.
18The last quarter ends in May instead of June 2017 because the Jun 2017 wave of the
SLP captures outcome values that correspond to behaviours in May 2017 (e.g.
respondents were asked whether they received income from work in the previous month).
19The presence of this subset within the control group in the main specification may lead
to attenuation bias, since individuals in this subset may suffer from self-selection problems.
Allowing a separate coefficient for this subset can help to address the attenuation bias.
20We can define the respondent’s spouse’s treatment status because respondents also
answered questions on their spouse’s SSS receipt.
21We do not use this as our main specification as not all respondents answer ques-
tions on whether their spouse receives SSS payouts, and also due to potentially greater
mismeasurement in respondents’ reports of whether their spouse received SSS payouts.
22We excluded individuals aged 64 in 2016 as some of them would be receiving SSS
payouts for the year 2017.
23Using age-ineligible controls may lead to attenuation of our results if individuals who
are age-ineligible but expect to receive SSS payouts in future start adjusting their behav-
iour even before they are age-eligible. This is unlikely to be an issue in our case—our
results in Section 7 suggest that such anticipatory behaviour does not exist in our sample.
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24These welfare payments include payments from Workfare Income Supplement
(WIS) and GST Vouchers. WIS encourages lower income workers to work by supple-
menting their income and retirement savings through cash payments and contributions
to the defined contribution scheme, CPF. GST vouchers can come in the form of cash.
These controls are not included in our main specification as these questions are posed
at lower frequency and therefore, not all respondents reply to these questions. This
leads to a considerable decrease in our sample size.We argue that other government
policies are unlikely to drive our results. Two major policies that affect elderly Singa-
poreans in the age group we study, are the Pioneer Generation Package (PGP) and eli-
gibility for CPF payouts. All individuals aged 65 or above in 2014 are eligible for the
Pioneer Generation Package (PGP) which provides healthcare subsidies that vary only
by age cohort, not socioeconomic status. As the age distribution of our trimmed sam-
ple is similar across the treatment and control groups, this policy is unlikely to affect
our analyses. We also note that PGP was already in place before the start of the SSS.
The CPF payout eligibility age is also unlikely to affect our analyses, as the eligibility
age also varies only by age cohort and not socioeconomic status. Furthermore, there is
no change in CPF eligibility status within the period of our study for both our main
and supplementary samples. All individuals in our main sample are already age-eligible
for CPF payouts at the start of our study period; all individuals in our supplementary
analyses will not be old enough to reach CPF payout eligibility age by the end of the
period studied.
25This method addresses the imbalance of baseline characteristics between the treated
and control groups by reweighting control observations based on their propensity score;
control observations with a higher propensity score are given a higher weight. We use the
Stata package absdid described in Houngbedji (2015) to implement this estimator.
26Column (2) includes individuals who did not work; the income for these individuals
are taken to be zero. The results for column (2) thus capture effects from both the
extensive and intensive margin. Column (3) includes only individuals who worked, and
thus captures mainly effects from the intensive margin.
27Having said this, we acknowledge that our estimates are not sufficiently precise to
exclude falls of approximately 4 percentage points in labour supply, which is within the
range of 4–6 percentage points estimated in the literature. However, the lack of a
response on the intensive margin, the fact that SSS payouts can only cover a fraction of
recipients’ monthly household expenditure, and the fact that SSS payouts are lower in
Singapore than in many other countries with non-contributory pensions (see footnote
7 for a brief comparison) lead us to conclude that similarly sized falls in labour supply
are unlikely to have occurred in our context.
28The average SSS payout in our sample is about 14% of the pre-announcement mean
monthly wage among SSS recipients who worked, lower than payouts from many other
non-contributory pensions studied in the literature. (See footnote 7 for more details on
payout levels in other studies.)
29Column (2) includes individuals who did not receive transfers, and thus captures
both intensive and extensive margin effects. Column (3) includes only individuals who
received transfers, and thus captures intensive margin effects.
30To recap, we use a control group from the age-ineligible cohort (Table 16) and dif-
ferent reweighting methods (Abadie (2005)’s semi-parametric DiD and 1:1 matching
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DiD in columns (7) and (8) of Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20) to address potential issues with
the parallel trends assumption in our main specification.
31The average SSS payout in our sample is about 14% of the pre-announcement mean
monthly wage among SSS recipients who worked, lower than payouts from many other
non-contributory pensions studied in the literature. (See footnote 7 for more details on
payout levels in other studies.)
32A detailed analysis of the reasons underlying the lack of crowding out is be-
yond the scope of our paper. Having said this, understanding why there is no
crowding out here is interesting, and we engage in some preliminary speculation
about the underlying reasons.A possible reason for the lack of crowding out could
be the design of the SSS. Recall that individuals who stay in one-/two-room flats
receive the highest payout quantum. These individuals, who are likely to be the
least financially able, are also likely to have family and friends who are less able to
provide cash support. Since they do not receive much cash transfers to start with,
it is not surprising if SSS has no effect on cash transfers. On the other hand, indi-
viduals who stay in larger flats (they receive the lowest SSS payout quantum) may
have more well-to-do relatives and friends who may not reduce their cash transfers
due to the relatively small SSS payouts.In our view, this line of reasoning is more
plausible for the lack of crowding out among SSS recipients who stay in larger
flats. While the lack of crowding out among poorer SSS recipients may be due in
part to the fact that fewer of them receive private cash transfers in the first place,
this explanation is unlikely to be the only reason, since substantial proportions of
those living in smaller flat-types (who receive the highest payouts) receive private
cash transfers as well. For example, during the period before the announcement of
SSS details, 26, 36, and 59% of SSS recipients in one-, two-, three-room flats re-
ceive private cash transfers respectively monthly. Conditional on receipt, they re-
ceive monthly averages of S$693, S$434, and S$817. These statistics suggest that
our finding of no effect on the receipt of private cash transfer can also be driven
by a lack of response from “donors” to SSS recipients.
33Summary statistics for this sample of younger individuals can be found in Tables 30
and 31 of Appendix 4.
34These improvements in subjective well-being may be due to reasons unrelated
to current consumption (e.g. improved retirement security arising from an unex-
pected increase in permanent income). In addition, we are unable to rule out the
possibility of these changes being due to increases in current consumption. While
our expenditure-related results are statistically insignificant, the point estimates are
positive and quite large.
35Respondent and spouse if the respondent is married.
36To a lesser extent, this may be a potential issue for total and non-durable expenditure
as well. This issue biases our results upwards and means that SSS receipt is even less likely
to have had much of an effect on these total and non-durable expenditure.
37To recap, we use age-ineligible controls (Table 25) and different reweighting
methods (Abadie (2005)’s semi-parametric DiD and 1:1 matching DiD in columns
(7) and (8) of Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29) to address potential issues with the paral-
lel trends assumption in our main estimates.
38To a lesser extent, total and non-durables expenditure face this issue as well.
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Appendix 1
8.1 Robustness checks for labour
Table 8 Robustness check for labour decisions—accounting for misreporting of SSS payout
receipt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whether
received income
Amount
received
Amount
received (positive)
Probability of working
full- time after age 70
Received SS × Jan 0.00542 22.73 − 183.1 −2.383
(0.0207) (68.19) (156.2) (3.313)
Received SS × Feb 0.00959 28.99 3.922 –
(0.0201) (34.37) (91.62) –
Received SS × Mar 0.0180 52.71 −125.8 –
(0.0197) (47.40) (220.2) –
Received SS × announce-to-pay × re-
ceived in 2016 and 2017
0.0268 123.6 32.67 −2.297
(0.0209) (121.4) (101.1) (3.579)
Received SS × post-pay × received in
2016 and 2017
−0.00415 82.01 21.38 −4.259
(0.0204) (99.73) (95.84) (3.264)
Observations 16,062 15,997 4596 3536
R-squared 0.808 0.701 0.751 0.638
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the individual and
monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in column (4) are collected at the
individual level every quarter
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (3). In the interest of space, we show only the coefficients from interacting
the policy variables with the dummy which represents the subset of individuals who reported receiving SSS payout at
least once in 2016 and at least once in 2017. The suppressed category of individuals are those who reported not
receiving SSS payout in 2016 and 2017. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65
and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 9 Robustness check for labour decisions—accounting for spousal receipt of SSS payout
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whether received
income
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Probability of working
full- time after age 70
Only respondent rcv SS × announce-to-
pay
0.0182 160.4 91.45 −2.008
(0.0223) (126.6) (120.3) (3.842)
Only spouse rcv SS × announce-to-pay 0.0341 98.83** 56.89 0.358
(0.0298) (44.73) (88.78) (9.202)
Both rcv SS × announce-to-pay 0.0186 53.09 69.12 −3.614
(0.0200) (43.77) (121.5) (3.919)
Only respondent rcv SS × post-pay −0.0127 144.8 165.4 −4.396
(0.0227) (106.2) (132.6) (3.375)
Only spouse rcv SS × post-pay 0.0467 129.8** 106.3 0.318
(0.0451) (58.53) (102.5) (7.000)
Both rcv SS × post-pay 0.00888 20.69 −54.55 −5.013
(0.0184) (39.37) (87.64) (3.785)
Observations 15,655 15,591 4444 3448
R-squared 0.808 0.712 0.772 0.627
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the individual and
monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in column (4) are collected at the
individual level every quarter
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (4). In the interest of space, we do not show the coefficients from the placebo
leads. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore
citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 10 Robustness check for labour decisions—using non-age-eligible sample as a control group
(propensity score 0.2–0.8)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whether received
income
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Probability of working full- time
after age 70
Received SS × Jan −0.00291 88.68 −3.822 −3.999
(0.0213) (70.25) (135.6) (3.207)
Received SS × Feb 0.0131 103.3** 132.3 –
(0.0202) (42.31) (89.68) –
Received SS × Mar −0.000928 23.89 −84.87 –
(0.0196) (60.51) (216.4) –
Received SS × announce-to-
pay
−0.00325 106.4 116.0 −1.452
(0.0177) (83.44) (93.47) (3.167)
Received SS × post-pay −0.0257 50.34 45.48 −3.421
(0.0166) (71.65) (91.28) (2.827)
Observations 17,500 17,458 8234 4962
R-squared 0.806 0.740 0.731 0.623
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. Values in columns (1)–(3) are reported at the individual and
monthly level, with column (3) including only responses with positive values. Values in column (4) are collected at the
individual level every quarter
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are Singapore citizens, live in
public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The treated group consists of individuals aged 65 and above
in 2016 who received SSS payouts, while the control group consists of younger individuals aged 56 to 63 in 2016 who
are not age eligible to receive SSS payouts yet
Chen and Tan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2018) 7:6 Page 28 of 54
Table 11 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on receiving income from work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 0.00601 0.00556 0.00581 0.00770 0.0143 0.0128 –
– (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0251) (0.0162) –
Received SS × Feb – 0.00805 0.0106 0.00745 0.0116 0.0264 0.0147 –
– (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0218) (0.0157) –
Received SS × Mar – 0.0184 0.0216 0.0177 0.0226 0.0183 0.0331** –
– (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0226) (0.0151) –
Received SS ×
Jan–Mar
– – – – – – – 0.0117
– – – – – – – P = 0.45
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
0.00710 0.0109 0.0125 0.00685 0.0142 0.0336 0.0178 0.0145
(0.0143) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0206) (0.0149) P = 0.43
Received SS × post-
pay
−0.0151 −0.00952 −0.0100 −0.0129 −0.00758 −0.00109 −0.00122 −0.0018
(0.0148) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0203) (0.0145) P = 0.92
Observations 16,062 15,769 16,062 16,062 16,062 11,213 1468 369
R-squared 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.810 0.809 0.813 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All values are reported at the individual and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time fixed
effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding receipt of
additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller because this data
is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation by their propensity of
receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match. Eq. (1) describes the baseline
model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 12 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on amount of income received
from work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 25.11 25.67 31.62 27.42 38.28 66.82 –
– (69.84) (70.04) (71.56) (69.72) (93.44) (52.85) –
Received SS × Feb – 24.20 29.53 28.24 32.68 42.70 59.67** –
– (34.10) (34.60) (34.30) (34.52) (38.15) (25.02) –
Received SS × Mar – 52.37 57.93 54.91 60.46 58.73 61.11* –
– (48.36) (48.56) (49.37) (48.96) (62.60) (34.55) –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – 40.73
– – – – – – – P = 0.23
Received SS × announce-
to-pay
82.24 97.51 97.31 97.72 102.0 148.6 93.11* 94.84*
(66.19) (79.63) (79.70) (82.68) (80.54) (111.1) (50.79) P = 0.06
Received SS × post-pay 52.42 69.03 67.14 70.97 75.13 101.6 83.42* 55.12
(55.47) (68.67) (69.09) (71.39) (70.13) (93.64) (45.21) P = 0.30
Observations 15,997 15,706 15,997 15,997 15,997 11,173 1468 369
R-squared 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.703 0.702 0.691 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All values are reported at the individual and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 13 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on probability of working full-time
after age 70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – −3.459 −2.346 − 2.617 − 2.218 − 1.444 − 2.019 –
– (3.513) (0) (3.267) (3.320) (3.955) (2.536) –
Received SS × Feb – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – –
Received SS × Mar – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – −2.182
– – – – – – – p = 0.469
Received SS × announce-
to-pay
−0.766 −2.697 −2.215 − 2.352 −2.070 − 0.0366 − 0.549 1.425
(2.294) (3.378) (0) (3.160) (3.213) (3.840) (2.518) p = 0.612
Received SS × post-pay −2.981 −5.189* − 4.368 −4.498 −4.365 − 4.763 −3.308 −1.559
(2.179) (3.137) (0) (2.952) (2.978) (3.417) (2.389) p = 0.612
Observations 3536 3089 3536 3536 3536 2401 771 159
R-squared 0.637 0.618 0.640 0.640 0.638 0.639 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All values are reported at the individual level, based on data collected every quarter
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Appendix 2
8.2 Robustness checks for private cash transfers
Table 14 Robustness check for private cash transfers—accounting for misreporting of SSS payout
receipt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount
received (positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount
given (positive)
Received SS × Jan −0.00626 14.16 13.48 0.0214 7.356 164.7
(0.0304) (37.17) (48.83) (0.0294) (27.74) (162.1)
Received SS × Feb 0.00809 30.29 62.82 0.0395 0.511 9.627
(0.0287) (33.56) (41.73) (0.0330) (29.00) (185.8)
Received SS × Mar 0.0428 37.94 35.43 0.00900 −23.07 −0.651
(0.0262) (28.67) (36.33) (0.0266) (23.51) (120.2)
Received SS × announce-to-pay
× received in 2016 and 2017
−0.0112 11.46 47.62 0.0387* 0.134 −8.465
(0.0247) (24.74) (36.80) (0.0201) (19.29) (140.1)
Received SS × post-pay ×
received in 2016 and 2017
−0.00349 47.11 79.30* 0.0134 − 18.00 −44.57
(0.0242) (31.67) (47.94) (0.0221) (22.42) (112.4)
Observations 15,486 15,451 9100 15,424 15,400 1940
R-squared 0.734 0.773 0.773 0.426 0.197 0.523
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (3). In the interest of space, we show only the coefficients from interacting
the policy variables with the dummy which represents the subset of individuals who reported receiving SSS payout at
least once in 2016 and at least once in 2017. The suppressed category of individuals are those who reported not
receiving SSS payout in 2016 and 2017. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65
and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 15 Robustness check for private cash transfers—accounting for spousal receipt of SSS payout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount given
(positive)
Only respondent rcv SS ×
announce-to-pay
0.00104 8.499 20.78 0.00818 −7.894 −4.269
(0.0246) (25.67) (34.44) (0.0221) (20.34) (141.6)
Only spouse rcv SS × announce-
to-pay
0.0433 86.72 17.68 0.0310 12.43 76.94
(0.0551) (59.43) (67.01) (0.0311) (19.16) (146.7)
Both rcv SS × announce-to-pay − 0.0265 37.58 79.87* 0.0356 25.95 125.1
(0.0306) (34.01) (42.16) (0.0224) (17.87) (117.5)
Only respondent rcv SS × post-pay 0.00567 27.55 38.39 −0.00937 −23.41 −43.97
(0.0258) (33.45) (44.56) (0.0218) (23.71) (105.2)
Only spouse rcv SS × post-pay 0.0886 161.6*** 75.10 0.0568 14.11 −63.72
(0.0565) (61.08) (55.70) (0.0381) (15.37) (173.6)
Both rcv SS × post-pay −0.0201 61.64 120.9*** 0.0387 18.20 77.32
(0.0296) (38.56) (45.72) (0.0273) (15.88) (107.4)
Observations 15,096 15,061 8861 15,038 15,014 1894
R-squared 0.732 0.771 0.771 0.429 0.195 0.521
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (4). In the interest of space, we do not show the coefficients from the placebo
leads. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore
citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 16 Robustness check for private cash transfers—using non-age-eligible sample as a control
group (propensity score 0.2–0.8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Whether
received
Amount
received
Amount received
(positive)
Whether
gave
Amount
given
Amount given
(positive)
Received SS × Jan −0.0301 62.92* 83.45* 0.0309 7.882 49.61
(0.0301) (32.81) (45.29) (0.0286) (28.57) (140.7)
Received SS × Feb 0.0331 68.68** 84.36* 0.0405 −33.12 −74.74
(0.0283) (32.12) (47.67) (0.0333) (33.01) (152.3)
Received SS × Mar 0.0218 44.33* 39.39 −0.00201 −18.68 39.67
(0.0250) (25.09) (35.54) (0.0272) (25.24) (100.2)
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
−0.0160 21.05 51.52* 0.00181 −0.137 −3.835
(0.0211) (21.33) (29.28) (0.0197) (18.47) (106.6)
Received SS × post-
pay
−0.0170 26.21 42.24 0.00697 −4.933 −26.99
(0.0209) (25.12) (35.87) (0.0210) (19.56) (83.39)
Observations 16,846 16,818 7514 16,760 16,739 3336
R-squared 0.763 0.814 0.834 0.536 0.307 0.550
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent
and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Columns (3) and (6) include only responses with positive values
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are Singapore citizens, live in
public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The treated group consists of individuals aged 65 and above
in 2016 who received SSS payouts, while the control group consists of younger individuals aged 56 to 63 in 2016 who
are not age eligible to receive SSS payouts yet
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Table 17 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on receiving private cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No
leads
Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/
GST
Abadie 1-1
matching
Received SS × Jan – −0.00947 −0.00721 − 0.00235 −0.00815 0.00847 −0.00726 –
– (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0348) (0.0255) –
Received SS × Feb – 0.00414 0.00775 0.0127 0.00614 −0.0131 0.00300 –
– (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0330) (0.0237) –
Received SS × Mar – 0.0370 0.0382 0.0426 0.0387 0.00933 0.0173 –
– (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0301) (0.0219) –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – 0.0172
– – – – – – – P = 0.40
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
−0.0241 −0.0179 −0.0173 −0.0128 −0.0203 −
0.0337
−0.0155 − 0.0145
(0.0170) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0260) (0.0183) P = 0.49
Received SS × post-pay −0.0212 −0.0173 −0.0135 − 0.00992 −0.0182 −
0.0247
−0.00077 − 0.00657
(0.0175) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0259) (0.0191) P = 0.80
Observations 15,486 15,182 15,486 15,486 15,486 10,796 1451 367
R-squared 0.733 0.734 0.735 0.735 0.734 0.757 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 18 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on amount of private cash transfers
received
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 12.83 14.59 12.04 12.64 33.70 30.98 –
– (37.20) (37.14) (37.90) (37.11) (45.78) (30.39) –
Received SS × Feb – 22.94 29.55 33.32 27.42 −19.56 23.62 –
– (33.63) (33.63) (33.81) (33.53) (38.42) (27.30) –
Received SS × Mar – 35.67 35.11 39.01 34.67 48.03 9.274 –
– (28.75) (28.55) (28.58) (28.75) (35.13) (27.11) –
Received SS × Jan–
Mar
– – – – – – – 15.66
– – – – – – – P = 0.51
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
−12.41 −1.234 −1.123 1.489 −3.895 −5.637 −
10.55
−9.70
(18.54) (22.57) (22.45) (22.71) (22.55) (28.03) (22.03) P = 0.65
Received SS × post-
pay
2.237 13.07 14.38 17.84 11.11 12.77 20.09 2.83
(23.04) (27.24) (27.24) (27.48) (26.77) (34.48) (22.39) P = 0.92
Observations 15,451 15,148 15,451 15,451 15,451 10,781 1451 366
R-squared 0.773 0.773 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.779 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 19 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on giving private cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 0.0245 0.0264 0.0251 0.0202 0.00388 0.0218 –
– (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0293) (0.0336) (0.0232) –
Received SS × Feb – 0.0422 0.0411 0.0487 0.0377 −0.00108 0.0391 –
– (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0338) (0.0328) (0.0380) (0.0255) –
Received SS × Mar – 0.00924 0.0104 0.0137 0.00675 −0.00481 −0.00330 –
– (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0311) (0.0211) –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – 0.0376*
– – – – – – – 0.081
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
0.0109 0.0219 0.0200 0.0232 0.0185 0.0164 0.0235 0.0415**
(0.0146) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0221) (0.0155) 0.027
Received SS × post-pay 0.000442 0.0120 0.0108 0.0145 0.00776 −0.0108 0.0199 0.0392**
(0.0151) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0239) (0.0153) 0.035
Observations 15,424 15,113 15,424 15,424 15,424 10,767 1450 366
R-squared 0.425 0.427 0.429 0.430 0.426 0.439 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 20 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on amount of private cash
transfers given
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No
leads
Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age
FE
WIS/
GST
Abadie 1-1
matching
Received SS × Jan – 7.625 6.930 10.24 6.614 8.259 −
5.844
–
– (27.97) (28.38) (28.80) (27.87) (36.14) (23.39) –
Received SS × Feb – 0.762 1.451 7.220 −0.113 −1.176 −
7.958
–
– (29.17) (29.13) (29.33) (29.07) (35.61) (23.63) –
Received SS × Mar – −25.28 − 25.49 − 22.30 −25.44 − 24.43 −
24.47
–
– (23.82) (23.76) (23.87) (23.63) (26.76) (16.45) –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – −1.10
– – – – – – – 0.95
Received SS × announce-
to-pay
7.680 5.007 4.091 7.130 4.621 0.529 1.352 14.22
(11.57) (16.59) (16.64) (16.36) (16.53) (18.14) (13.73) 0.39
Received SS × post-pay −2.928 −5.684 −6.150 −2.365 −
5.663
−17.94 0.308 12.33
(11.41) (18.37) (18.45) (17.91) (18.25) (23.05) (14.85) 0.47
Observations 15,400 15,091 15,400 15,400 15,400 10,753 1450 366
R-squared 0.196 0.196 0.197 0.202 0.197 0.210 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All transfer values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Appendix 3
8.3 Expenditure-related results
In general, we are unable to make definitive statements about this set of outcomes,
due to the imprecision of our estimates. There is some evidence of a rise in dura-
bles expenditure, but our identifying assumption does not seem to hold well for
durables expenditure. These results thus need to be interpreted with caution. The
rest of this section discusses our results on the effect of receiving the SSS on
expenditure-related outcomes in more detail.
Table 21 reports the effect of receiving SSS payouts on recipients’ expenditure
(at the couple level35). The coefficients related to the announcement and disburse-
ment effects are generally quite large in magnitude, but imprecise and thus statisti-
cally insignificant across the variables studied. However, there is some evidence of
a rise in durables-related expenditure during the announcement-to-payment and
post-disbursement periods, as well as a small rise in expenditure related to clothes
and personal care in the announcement-to-payment period.
Table 22 shows that there is little evidence that the consumption response to re-
ceiving SSS payouts has changed over time, though the increased expenditure on
durables may be concentrated in the announcement-to-payment and early disburse-
ment period. In general, the effect does not seem to vary substantially by recipi-
ents’ flat-type or gender, though there is suggestive evidence that SSS recipients
who are more financially prepared for retirement/have higher income may spend
more on health-related consumption (results available on request).
A concern with these results, however, is that the identifying assumption may
not hold up well for some variables. Our identification assumption appears to hold
reasonably well for total and non-durable expenditure—the placebo leads in
Table 21 are statistically insignificant, and the trends plotted in Fig. 4 suggest that
the pre-treatment trends for the treated and control groups are similar. However,
while the placebo leads for expenditure on durables are statistically insignificant,
the pre-treatment trends for the treated and control groups look quite different.
Figure 4 suggests that our durables-related results could be driven by the trend differ-
ence in the pre-treatment period: the pre-treatment trend for the control group falls
much more quickly than that of treated group at the start; this could lead to an over-
estimation of the effect of SSS on durables expenditure among the treated.36 Unfortu-
nately, the robustness checks that could potentially address the issue of differing time
trends between the treated and control groups do not appear to be very effective, as
the coefficients of the placebo leads are often large and sometimes marginally signifi-
cant (see Table 25 and columns (7) and (8) of Tables 26, 27, 28 and 2937). Our
durables-related estimates in all specifications in this paper may thus be
overestimated.38
Apart from the potential issue of differing time trends between the control and treat-
ment groups, the other robustness checks designed to address potential attenuation
(Tables 23 and 24) and test the sensitivity of our results to other specification
(Tables 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29) show that our results seem to be robust to these issues.
Our results are also robust to transforming our variables using the inverse hyperbolic
sine, which approximates the natural logarithm but maps zero to zero (see e.g.
Burbidge et al. 1988; MacKinnon and Magee 1990) (results available on request).
Chen and Tan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2018) 7:6 Page 39 of 54
In all, we find little evidence that the SSS led to increases in total and non-
durables expenditure, and some suggestive evidence that durables expenditure may
have risen in response to SSS receipt. Unfortunately, our ability to make definitive
statements about the lack of an effect of the SSS on total and non-durables ex-
penditure is hampered by the imprecision of our estimates. In addition, our identi-
fying assumption does not seem to hold well for durables expenditure; these
results thus need to be interpreted with caution. Our expenditure-related results
should thus be corroborated by studies using other datasets before a more defini-
tive conclusion can be made.
Fig. 4 Trends of key expenditure-related variables (The periods to the left of the first and second dotted
vertical lines refer to the pre-announcement and pre-disbursement periods respectively)
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Table 21 Overall impact of receiving SSS payouts on expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Received SS ×
Jan
10.937 25.418 17.144 −13.574 −10.347 − 1.938 −0.111 3.103 1.200
(105.715) (47.887) (44.492) (85.963) (22.578) (1.984) (10.434) (27.815) (32.623)
Received SS ×
Feb
170.274 78.893 50.216 91.707 18.021 1.001 7.918 −12.850 39.023
(117.335) (49.606) (41.931) (100.368) (21.920) (2.097) (8.396) (26.393) (54.562)
Received SS ×
Mar
221.451 52.306 50.469 170.399 − 9.369 −2.991 1.487 −14.530 40.765
(179.048) (49.028) (46.316) (167.223) (19.988) (2.499) (7.263) (27.417) (53.174)
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
93.081 62.228* 57.854** 33.854 24.822 −1.395 11.131** −34.256 7.342
(95.860) (32.291) (26.022) (84.060) (16.196) (1.899) (5.534) (31.446) (28.729)
Received SS ×
post-pay
113.425 57.062* 44.246 56.290 −3.672 −1.392 5.915 5.659 11.416
(93.064) (31.672) (27.181) (79.732) (17.224) (2.153) (5.768) (21.905) (26.971)
Mean 1414 84 51 1330 412 8 61 171 122
S.D. 2029 403 346 1934 317 48 111 572 662
Observations 15,970 16,019 16,019 15,970 16,019 15,909 15,914 16,019 16,019
R-squared 0.38 0.13 0.12 0.44 0.73 0.85 0.38 0.20 0.18
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the couple
(respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash gifts.
Durables include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance. Durables
subset includes only furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on the
difference between total expenditure and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in columns
(5)–(9) are not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible
for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity
score of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for
respondents who received SSS payouts
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Table 22 Temporal impact of receiving SSS payouts on expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Received SS × Jan 10.96 25.42 17.15 −13.56 − 10.34 − 1.938 −0.111 3.104 1.202
(105.7) (47.89) (44.50) (85.97) (22.58) (1.984) (10.43) (27.82) (32.62)
Received SS × Feb 170.4 78.94 50.26 91.79 18.00 1.000 7.930 −12.82 39.06
(117.3) (49.61) (41.93) (100.4) (21.92) (2.097) (8.395) (26.39) (54.58)
Received SS × Mar 221.6 52.35 50.50 170.5 −9.365 −2.991 1.495 −14.51 40.79
(179.1) (49.03) (46.32) (167.2) (19.99) (2.499) (7.264) (27.42) (53.17)
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
93.58 62.38* 57.99** 34.20 24.85 −1.395 11.16** −34.18 7.451
(95.86) (32.30) (26.03) (84.04) (16.19) (1.898) (5.537) (31.45) (28.71)
Received SS ×
Aug-Sep 2016
185.7* 79.09** 63.42** 106.0 2.166 −1.336 8.770 16.14 29.78
(98.10) (35.30) (28.42) (82.81) (18.38) (2.097) (6.582) (29.40) (39.63)
Received SS ×
Oct-Dec 2016
94.09 48.21 32.89 46.20 6.902 −0.726 4.595 −1.649 −2.303
(95.73) (39.94) (34.76) (78.81) (18.41) (2.414) (6.789) (26.37) (28.84)
Received SS ×
Jan-Mar 2017
75.33 47.37 39.31 27.60 −13.18 −1.812 3.015 2.897 13.82
(105.9) (33.80) (29.08) (92.86) (19.71) (2.278) (6.099) (26.67) (32.91)
Received SS ×
Apr-May 2017
125.5 62.46 49.35 63.29 −11.86 −1.848 9.350 10.25 9.948
(106.2) (38.58) (34.65) (95.81) (19.91) (2.799) (8.237) (33.34) (36.45)
Observations 15,970 16,019 16,019 15,970 16,019 15,909 15,914 16,019 16,019
R-squared 0.384 0.128 0.124 0.440 0.727 0.848 0.383 0.197 0.183
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the couple
(respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash gifts. Durables
include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance. Durables subset includes only
furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on the difference between total expenditure
and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in columns (5)–(9) are not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (2). The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS
(i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 23 Robustness check for expenditure—accounting for misreporting of SSS payout receipt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Received SS × Jan 8.175 25.60 17.35 −16.55 −10.15 − 1.906 −0.153 4.486 2.436
(107.4) (47.89) (44.52) (88.05) (22.57) (1.971) (10.41) (27.71) (32.47)
Received SS × Feb 170.1 78.94 50.31 91.50 17.96 1.008 7.868 −12.55 39.37
(117.8) (49.56) (41.90) (100.9) (21.93) (2.092) (8.403) (26.39) (54.68)
Received SS × Mar 220.3 54.60 52.25 166.8 −8.503 −2.932 1.698 −12.63 43.40
(182.7) (49.23) (46.55) (170.9) (19.96) (2.487) (7.186) (27.44) (53.21)
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay ×
received in 2016
and 2017
135.0 62.74* 60.00** 76.84 15.40 −1.707 11.79* −31.40 12.26
(104.6) (37.41) (29.04) (90.54) (17.26) (2.244) (6.187) (35.42) (36.67)
Received SS × post-pay
× received in 2016
and 2017
114.3 60.64* 56.39* 53.70 −9.874 −1.444 6.330 −22.83 5.856
(99.27) (36.04) (31.02) (86.54) (18.61) (2.364) (5.735) (25.25) (32.08)
Observations 15,970 16,019 16,019 15,970 16,019 15,909 15,914 16,019 16,019
R-squared 0.385 0.128 0.124 0.440 0.728 0.848 0.384 0.199 0.184
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the couple
(respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash gifts.
Durables include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance. Durables
subset includes only furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on the differ-
ence between total expenditure and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in columns (5)–(9)
are not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (3). In view of space constraint, we show only the coefficients from
interacting the policy variables with the dummy which represents the subset of individuals who reported
receiving SSS payout at least once in 2016 and at least once in 2017. The suppressed category of individuals is
those who reported not receiving SSS payout in 2016 and 2017. The sample is restricted to respondents who
are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and
with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 24 Robustness check for expenditure—accounting for spousal receipt of SSS payout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Only respondent
rcv SS × announce-to-pay
92.26 55.18 52.95* 42.10 28.21 −0.179 11.97** −41.57 2.280
(111.4) (36.26) (28.77) (99.58) (17.82) (1.571) (6.029) (32.98) (35.27)
Only spouse rcv SS ×
announce-to-pay
59.87 16.91 30.76 43.15 93.77** 2.012 17.26** −110.8 −12.89
(158.8) (39.96) (32.10) (147.8) (36.81) (1.830) (8.396) (74.20) (57.23)
Both rcv SS × announce-
to-pay
109.7 74.87* 69.29** 35.36 50.94** 0.555 11.59 −50.59 5.009
(120.5) (42.66) (34.81) (104.1) (23.56) (2.411) (8.342) (40.32) (41.74)
Only respondent rcv SS ×
post-pay
142.8 49.53 37.80 93.15 1.027 −0.0568 8.244 22.33 1.177
(106.6) (35.72) (29.82) (90.86) (17.90) (1.988) (6.511) (23.27) (30.08)
Only spouse rcv SS ×
post-pay
186.1 17.24 14.25 168.8 42.57 2.795 15.85* −85.69 116.5
(156.7) (46.57) (40.09) (141.3) (35.32) (2.282) (9.249) (52.43) (74.40)
Both rcv SS × post-pay 105.5 61.79 51.00 43.39 10.08 0.288 3.690 −28.27 35.09
(117.3) (42.79) (38.08) (101.4) (26.01) (2.897) (8.202) (32.23) (38.70)
Observations 15,569 15,617 15,617 15,569 15,617 15,507 15,513 15,617 15,617
R-squared 0.383 0.128 0.124 0.438 0.729 0.858 0.381 0.198 0.181
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the couple
(respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash gifts.
Durables include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance. Durables
subset includes only furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on the difference
between total expenditure and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in columns (5)–(9) are
not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (4). In the interest of space, we do not show the coefficients from the
placebo leads. The sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8
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Table 25 Robustness check for expenditure—using non-age-eligible sample as a control group
(propensity score 0.2–0.8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Received SS × Jan 111.0 5.357 −12.66 105.7 7.445 −3.227 −4.391 47.79 35.54
(153.9) (38.17) (34.88) (145.2) (22.58) (2.466) (12.17) (40.10) (48.63)
Received SS × Feb 153.5 73.85 37.24 79.19 19.53 −1.315 13.62 17.77 44.15
(170.9) (45.52) (37.66) (158.9) (21.25) (1.995) (10.31) (42.65) (66.39)
Received SS × Mar 470.8** 58.21 40.48 413.1** 3.183 −3.691 7.109 58.16 86.22
(206.6) (48.21) (44.08) (192.1) (18.80) (2.598) (8.428) (41.05) (60.52)
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
228.1* 31.31 14.87 199.6* 26.94* −1.533 20.49*** 37.98 35.32
(125.3) (25.85) (19.94) (114.9) (15.67) (2.126) (6.378) (37.39) (35.69)
Received SS × post-
pay
262.7** 63.79*** 46.10** 198.2* 6.973 −0.766 13.32** 40.09 32.94
(124.5) (23.33) (18.26) (114.1) (16.52) (2.258) (6.467) (34.54) (31.12)
Observations 17,387 17,440 17,440 17,387 17,440 17,340 17,335 17,440 17,440
R-squared 0.582 0.158 0.120 0.598 0.767 0.775 0.500 0.214 0.206
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the couple
(respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash gifts. Durables
include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance. Durables subset includes only
furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on the difference between total expenditure
and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in columns (5)–(9) are not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are Singapore citizens, live in
public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The treated group consists of individuals aged 65 and above
in 2016 who received SSS payouts, while the control group consists of younger individuals aged 56 to 63 in 2016 who
are not age eligible to receive SSS payouts yet
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Table 26 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on total expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 9.866 16.57 10.13 9.867 17.50 117.0 –
– (106.1) (102.9) (109.9) (104.9) (103.3) (130.8) –
Received SS × Feb – 164.0 170.3 176.2 169.7 143.6 135.7 –
– (118.0) (115.1) (122.9) (117.4) (114.6) (88.12) –
Received SS × Mar – 229.0 232.0 249.6 223.1 186.1 245.0* –
– (181.2) (179.8) (192.1) (179.4) (118.7) (136.4) –
Received SS × Jan–
Mar
– – – – – – – 187.36**
– – – – – – – P = 0.053
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
36.41 91.26 97.47 93.36 91.64 91.10 109.2 158.21*
(75.78) (96.35) (93.59) (99.24) (95.07) (88.30) (68.02) P = 0.086
Received SS × post-
pay
57.10 111.8 115.6 122.8 109.4 91.88 145.6** 170.22*
(72.68) (93.40) (91.45) (95.32) (91.94) (89.12) (69.20) P = 0.065
Observations 15,970 15,671 15,970 15,970 15,970 11,171 1466 368
R-squared 0.384 0.384 0.386 0.391 0.385 0.501 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All expenditure values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level.
Total expenditure excludes cash gifts
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 27 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on durables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 25.78 22.45 25.60 24.31 −2.849 13.08 –
– (47.95) (47.20) (49.42) (47.45) (54.26) (36.59) –
Received SS × Feb – 79.68 76.12 78.95 78.98 43.61 46.08 –
– (50.01) (47.81) (52.19) (49.52) (43.16) (36.89) –
Received SS × Mar – 52.89 54.48 56.41 54.03 67.94 56.85* –
– (49.56) (49.31) (49.66) (49.36) (66.14) (29.63) –
Received SS × Jan–
Mar
– – – – – – – 49.05
– – – – – – – P = 0.14
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
40.76 64.38** 62.38* 64.66* 63.08** 49.50 53.41** 69.19**
(27.89) (32.44) (32.29) (34.42) (32.12) (31.23) (20.98) P = 0.028
Received SS × post-
pay
35.68 56.83* 57.27* 59.87* 56.60* 36.39 36.76* 47.61
(27.77) (31.79) (31.65) (33.25) (31.38) (31.79) (19.91) P = 0.16
Observations 16,019 15,721 16,019 16,019 16,019 11,196 1467 368
R-squared 0.127 0.128 0.129 0.134 0.129 0.100 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All expenditure values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level.
Durables include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 28 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on durables subset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – 17.56 14.09 19.84 16.80 − 11.86 − 8.470 –
– (44.54) (43.77) (45.82) (44.13) (51.19) (32.89) –
Received SS × Feb – 50.81 47.02 51.95 51.27 8.538 20.86 –
– (42.27) (39.67) (44.42) (41.92) (27.80) (31.24) –
Received SS × Mar – 51.09 51.57 56.97 53.11 63.01 46.70* –
– (46.85) (46.73) (46.78) (46.50) (65.24) (27.26) –
Received SS × Jan–
Mar
– – – – – – – 37.24
– – – – – – – P = 0.20
Received SS ×
announce-to-pay
41.58* 59.50** 57.64** 61.81** 59.28** 48.45** 48.09*** 55.12**
(21.59) (26.15) (26.02) (28.51) (25.89) (22.34) (16.98) P = 0.04
Received SS × post-
pay
28.05 44.26 43.96 48.94* 43.46 27.21 29.73* 36.00
(23.41) (27.30) (27.17) (28.91) (26.79) (26.50) (16.71) P = 0.21
Observations 16,019 15,721 16,019 16,019 16,019 11,196 1467 368
R-squared 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.130 0.125 0.085 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All expenditure values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level.
Durables subset includes furniture/furnishings and household appliances
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Table 29 Robustness check for impact of receiving SSS payouts on non-durables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No leads Balanced Ethnic
trends
Flat-type
trends
Age FE WIS/ GST Abadie 1-1 matching
Received SS × Jan – −15.00 −5.038 − 14.48 −
13.42
21.31 108.5 –
– (86.33) (83.11) (87.69) (85.73) (85.22) (123.7) –
Received SS × Feb – 84.61 94.51 97.38 91.04 100.5 90.50 –
– (100.9) (98.60) (104.0) (100.8) (105.9) (76.87) –
Received SS × Mar – 177.3 178.7 193.5 170.3 119.7 190.4 –
– (169.3) (167.9) (179.7) (167.3) (106.8) (128.3) –
Received SS × Jan–Mar – – – – – – – 137.39
– – – – – – – P = 0.12
Received SS × announce-
to-pay
−1.687 29.89 38.11 31.31 31.65 46.04 58.58 88.76
(64.79) (84.55) (81.37) (84.88) (83.24) (82.23) (62.34) P = 0.25
Received SS × post-pay 21.01 54.90 58.25 62.63 52.82 55.70 108.5* 119.76
(59.87) (80.02) (77.87) (79.66) (78.42) (79.68) (62.46) P = 0.10
Observations 15,970 15,671 15,970 15,970 15,970 11,171 1466 368
R-squared 0.439 0.439 0.443 0.446 0.440 0.515 – –
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2All expenditure values are reported at the couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level.
Non-durables are based on the difference between total expenditure and durables
3Columns (1)–(8) show results from additional robustness checks carried out. These checks are: (1) removal of the lead
terms; (2) restricting the sample to a “balanced” panel, where each individual has at least one observation in the pre-
announcement, announcement-to-disbursement, and post-disbursement periods; (3) allowing for ethnicity-specific time
fixed effects; (4) allowing for flat-type-specific time fixed effects; (5) adding age fixed effects as a control; (6) adding
receipt of additional welfare payments (Workfare Income Supplement; GST Vouchers) as a control—sample is smaller
because this data is not collected every wave and not everyone responds every wave; (7) reweighting each observation
by their propensity of receiving SSS as in Abadie (2005); and (8) DiD matching with a 1-1 nearest neighbour match.
Eq. (1) describes the baseline model used in these checks
4For columns (1)–(6), the sample is restricted to respondents who are age-eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 65 and above in
2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity score of 0.2–0.8. The number of observations
in these columns refers to the number of individual-month observations. For columns (7) and (8), the number of observations
refers to number of respondents, and the sample is not restricted by the propensity score. The sample, however, is smaller
than the full sample due to data availability issues specific to the estimation of (7) and (8)
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Appendix 4
8.4 Additional results for non-age-eligible sample
Table 30 Summary statistics for baseline demographics considered in propensity score
estimation—comparison between those who expected and did not expect SSS payout, among
individuals aged 56 to 63 in 2016
Untrimmed sample Trimmed sample (propensity score 0.2–0.8)
Expected SS
(N1 = 1558)
Did not
(N1 = 1425)
Norm
diff2
Diff in
means3
Expected SS
(N1 = 1430)
Did not
(N1 = 1380)
Norm
diff2
Diff in
means3
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age at 2016 59.29 2.26 59.21 2.25 0.03 0.07 59.27 2.26 59.21 2.25 0.03 0.06
Married 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40 −0.05 − 0.02 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.39 −0.04 − 0.02
Male 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 −0.03 − 0.01 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 −0.02 −0.01
Chinese 0.80 0.40 0.89 0.31 −0.27 −0.10*** 0.83 0.37 0.91 0.29 −0.22 −0.07***
Malay 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.06*** 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.04***
Indian 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.03*** 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.03***
No formal schooling 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 −0.02 0.00
Primary schooling 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.03* 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.03*
Secondary schooling 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.15 0.08*** 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.14 0.07***
Lives in 1-room flat 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00
Lives in 2-room flat 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01*** 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 −0.01 0.00
Lives in 3-room flat 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.04*** 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.05***
Lives in 4-room flat 0.42 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.10 0.05** 0.42 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.11 0.05***
Lives in 5-room flat 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.47 −0.14 −0.06*** 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.47 −0.13 −0.06***
Owns home 0.91 0.28 0.94 0.24 −0.09 −0.02** 0.94 0.24 0.94 0.23 −0.03 −0.01
No. of hh members 3.59 1.57 3.66 1.43 −0.04 −0.07 3.57 1.50 3.64 1.40 −0.05 −0.07
No. of total children 2.01 1.32 1.91 1.16 0.08 0.10** 1.96 1.26 1.91 1.15 0.05 0.06
Retirement
preparedness4
2.24 0.85 2.36 0.93 −0.13 −0.12*** 2.25 0.85 2.35 0.92 −0.11 −0.10***
Notes:
1N refers to number of respondents
2Normalised differences are computed as in Imbens (2015) (as the difference in means standardised by the square root
of the mean variance of both groups)
3***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively
4This is a self-assessment on preparedness for retirement, captured on a scale of 1 to 5, with a higher value representing
greater preparedness. This was captured during the baseline survey, which was conducted before the announcement of
details on the Silver Support Scheme
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Table 31 Summary statistics for pre-announcement dependent variables (Trimmed sample with
0.2–0.8 propensity score)
Aged 56 to 63 in 2016
Expected SS Did not
N1 Mean SD N1 Mean SD
Rcv private cash trf2 7875 0.33 0.47 7633 0.31 0.46
Amount received2,3 7857 231.35 461.00 7621 242.54 504.07
Give private cash trf2 7814 0.29 0.45 7569 0.30 0.46
Amount given2,3 7809 122.02 354.73 7562 149.46 416.81
Rcv income from work 8869 0.70 0.46 8625 0.71 0.45
Amount of income3 8839 1951 2514 8594 2393 3057
Prob of working full-time after age 62 1965 48.45 34.68 1928 46.78 35.22
Prob of working full-time after age 65 2174 37.68 33.48 2151 34.91 33.51
Prob of working full-time after age 70 2171 22.27 29.04 2149 18.91 28.07
Total expenditure2 8784 2835 3686 8537 3198 3545
Durables2,3 8822 164 618 8569 183 630
Durables subset2,3 8822 100 490 8569 101 473
Non-durables2 8784 2671 3444 8537 3015 3362
Notes:
1N refers to the number of observations at the respondent-wave level
2These variables are reported at the couple level (respondent and spouse if respondent is married)
3These variables include observations with zero values, e.g. if respondent did not receive any income from work, amount
of income will be recorded as 0
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Table 32 Overall impact of expecting to receive SSS payouts on expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Total Durables Durables
subset
Non-
durables
Food Tobacco Clothes
/Personal care
Health Leisure
Expect SS ×
Jan
−68.379 18.019 19.350 −86.938 −31.640** −0.555 −14.250 −46.806 50.585
(139.636) (28.243) (24.608) (137.294) (15.070) (1.590) (9.748) (30.136) (39.239)
Expect SS ×
Feb
−99.090 −8.907 −12.342 −91.930 −42.000*** −3.273** −6.404 −4.536 9.008
(121.981) (25.782) (20.502) (117.385) (14.922) (1.449) (9.043) (38.690) (42.351)
Expect SS ×
Mar
−57.994 −10.236 0.636 −49.712 −4.271 −0.546 −10.387 −26.709 36.064
(120.390) (29.203) (20.584) (110.939) (12.340) (1.523) (7.084) (32.638) (46.388)
Expect SS ×
announce-
to-pay
−84.394 10.821 6.566 −95.980 −11.067 −0.162 −3.866 −50.422* − 9.492
(100.114) (21.105) (16.892) (93.502) (10.247) (1.212) (5.514) (27.173) (31.962)
Expect SS ×
post-pay
−14.862 9.497 4.361 −25.130 −9.749 0.145 1.556 −32.876 20.122
(95.429) (18.504) (14.501) (89.345) (11.414) (1.296) (5.411) (24.668) (24.786)
Mean 2835 164 100 2671 532 20 135 273 260
S.D. 3686 618 490 3444 437 71 221 843 886
Observations 51,240 51,402 51,402 51,240 51,402 51,054 51,039 51,402 51,402
R-squared 0.56 0.15 0.11 0.56 0.75 0.84 0.49 0.22 0.20
Notes:
1Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level of significance respectively
2Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. All expenditure values are reported at the
couple (respondent and spouse if respondent is married) and monthly level. Total expenditure excludes cash
gifts. Durables include furniture/furnishings, household appliances, home and vehicle repair/maintenance.
Durables subset includes only furniture/furnishings and household appliances. Non-durables are based on
the difference between total expenditure and durables. The sub-categories of non-durables captured in
columns (5)–(9) are not exhaustive
3Results are estimates of coefficients in Eq. (1). The sample is restricted to respondents who are not age-
eligible for SSS (i.e. aged 56 to 63 in 2016), Singapore citizens, live in public housing flats, and with a propensity
score of 0.2–0.8
4Mean and standard deviation statistics are based on pre-announcement levels of the dependent variable for
respondents who expected to receive SSS payouts
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